In this paper we present the rst multisignature scheme giving message recovery based on the discrete logarithm problem. An e cient multisignature scheme with appendix has been proposed by Harn recently. We cryptanalyze this scheme, present two attacks and show how to countermeasure them. Furthermore we adopt the Meta-ElGamal and Meta-Message recovery signature scheme with one and two message blocks to the slightly modi ed scheme and give conditions which variants can be used. We show that for the variants giving message recovery it is useful to apply the variants with two message blocks to prevent the described attacks and to guarantee the e ciency of the scheme.
Introduction
A multisignature scheme allows multiple signers to sign the same message. A simple solution is that every signer signs the message using a normal signature scheme, but this has the drawback that the data expansion increases with the number of signers. The goal is to design a multisignature scheme without data expansion depending on the number of signers.
Recently a multisignature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem with this property was proposed by Harn Har194, Har294] . We give a brief review of this scheme in section 2 and present two attacks and countermeasure them in section 3. Then the Meta-ElGamal (MEG) signature scheme HMP194, HMP294] and Meta-Message recovery (MMR) signature scheme HMP394] are brie y described in sections 4 and 5. After this we show in sections 6 and 7 how to generalize the modi ed multisignature scheme to some variants of the the MEG-and MMR-signature scheme and give conditions which variants can be used. The scheme in section 7 is the rst multisignature scheme giving message recovery based on the discrete logarithm problem.
The basic multisignature scheme
First we review the underlying signature scheme and how this can be extended to provide multisignatures Har294].
A trusted third party chooses a large prime p, a generator 2 Z p and publishes them as system parameters. The signer Alice chooses a random number x A 2 Z p?1 and computes y A := x A (mod p). She publishes y A and keeps x A secret. These values are constant for all messages to be signed. To sign a message m 0 2 Z p?1 Alice computes m := h(m 0 ) with a suitable hash function h, chooses a random number k 2 Z p?1 and computes r := k (mod p). (1)
The triple (m; r; s) is the signed message. It can be veri ed by checking the congruence r s y m+r A (mod p):
In a multisignature scheme we have t di erent signers u 1 ; : : :; u t . Each of them has a secret key x i 2 Z p?1 and a related public key y i := x i (mod p). Each 
Cryptanalysis of the scheme and countermeasures
In this section we present two attacks which threaten the security of the scheme unless modi ed. The rst can be countermeasured easily while the second is somewhat harder but can also be avoided.
The rst attack
The attacker's (Carol) aim is to claim that a signature for a message m which is given by the users Alice, Bob and Donald is additionally signed by Carol and Alice. Thus no veri er can proof which of the persons has really signed the message and nobody trusts the scheme anymore.
The trick is that Carol is a normal user with a public key y C . She chooses this key not by choosing x C randomly and computing y C := x C (mod p) but she computes y C := y B y D (mod p). Note that this attack is weak because Carol doesn't know her own secret key and as a result she can't sign any message. But as the congruence y A y B y D y A y C (mod p) and the veri cation equation (3) of the multisignature scheme hold no veri er can decide if any message was signed by Alice, Bob and Donald or just by Alice and Carol.
With a slight modi cation this attack can easily be countermeasured: The trusted third party accepts just those public keys y i where the signer can proof that he knows the discrete logarithm of the public-key using the zero-knowledge-proof due to Chaum, Evertse and van de Graaf ChEG87]. Obviously this attack does not work anymore now. Another solution, due to one of the anonymous referees, is that every user i signs a xed message (e.g. "My public key is y i ") and sends the signature to the trusted third party. It is accepted if the veri cation equation holds and -to avoid a replay attack -y i was not used before by any other user. Now one member, e.g. Carol, recomputes her chosen k C with
and the condition is satis ed. Note that l must be chosen relatively prime to p ? is that the number of signers or the identity of the signers is appended to the message. If we sign the original message (which is always the case using message recovery signature schemes) we have the drawback that the expansion rate of the signed message (that is the ratio of the length of the signature parameters and the length of the message) increases. But if we can sign the hashvalue of the message or include the identity of the signers in the signature equation then there is no drawback at all and thus the attack can be countermeasured. We present the resulting schemes in the next sections in detail.
The Meta-ElGamal signature scheme
The Meta-ElGamal signature scheme has been proposed in HMP194] and is based on ideas rst published in HoPe94].
For an ElGamal signature ElGa84, ElGa85] the trusted authority chooses a large prime p and a generator 2 Z p . p and are public system parameters and authentically known to all users. The signer Alice chooses her secret key x A 2 Z p?1 and computes y A := x A (mod p). as an argument but in the following description we omit this for the sake of clearness.
The parameter s should either be used as argument in only one of the three functions or the functions have to be chosen carefully, such that the signature equation can be solved. Also all of the parameters m; r; s have to occur at least once. If two or three functions use exactly the same arguments, then they should be chosen as di erent operations. The occurrence of the insecure rs? and ms?variants HMP194] , where the parameters r and s (m and s) occur exactly in one of the three functions e; f and g together but neither r nor s (m nor s) occurs in one of the two other, should be avoided. All four conditions apply also for equivalent variants, in which the signature equations can be transformed into each other. Furthermore none of the three functions should be equal to zero. To get e cient variants, the functions should be chosen, such that s can be easily extracted (e.g. without inversions). It's also an advantage to choose one of the functions equal to one, to obtain an e cient signature veri cation. This veri cation is done by checking the equation A y B A r C (mod p):
As there are numerous variants, in the following we will only consider some e cient special All these generalizations can also be applied to the ElGamal signature scheme with two message blocks (Type EG VI { EG X) and the signature scheme with three message blocks (Type EG XI) ElGa84, HMP194]. Combining the described variations we get the MetaElGamal signature scheme which can be written as In a simpli ed manner, we can also describe the Meta-ElGamal scheme by the tuple (Mode; d; e; f; g) but then we loose useful structural information for the security analysis.
Therefore we prefer the rst notation although it contains redundancy.
The Meta-Message recovery scheme
In a similar manner the ideas of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme were applied to signature schemes giving message recovery HMP394].
The basic Message recovery scheme Among these only the types MR I, III and V are solvable for all choices of e; f; g. The most e cient types are the Type MR I { IV if we choose the parameter C = 1, because we need no inversion for message recovery. In Type MR II, IV, VI { X we have to choose suitable functions e; f; g to guarantee the solvability for the parameter s. In Type MR IV, we have to choose di erent functions f; g without homomorphic properties to guarantee the security of the signature scheme. It is argued in HMP394] that Mode L is best suited for message recovery schemes.
We also have message recovery schemes for two and three message blocks, where the functions e; f; g have arguments m 2 ; r; s. Among these especially the following types, described by the permutation of the coe cients A; B; C will be considered later: Table 1 gives an overview about the suitable ElGamal variants of the rst ve types for multisignature schemes. The corresponding types of the Meta-ElGamal Multisignature scheme are abbreviated by EM followed by the capital roman number of the corresponding ElGamal variants.
The function f can be chosen arbitrarily as far as the necessary conditions described in section 4 hold, while the function g must satisfy the additional condition that g(m; s) P t i=1 g(m; s i ) (mod q) in types EM III.3 and EM III.4 or g(r; s) P t i=1 g(r; s i ) (mod q) in types EM V.3 and EM V.4. Note that the computation He keeps x i secret and sends y i authentic to the trusted third party. Furthermore he shows that he knows the discrete logarithm of y i using the zero-knowledge proof due to Chaum, Evertse and van de Graaf. Then the accepted public-keys are published by the trusted third party. Alternatively the user u i signs a xed message (which includes the public key y i ) using his secret key x i . He sends it to the trusted third party who accepts it if y i has not been used as a public key of any other user so far. Another solution for avoiding the second attack described in section 3 is to use signature schemes with two message blocks. This solution might be used if the message itself and not a hash value should be signed. Here we use one message block for the message. The other one contains the hash value of the identities ID i of all signers. We give a more detailed description of this approach in the next section.
As He eavesdrops r A;1 and s A;1 of user Alice from the signature generation and tries to use this for generating a new signature. He puts r A;1 into the broadcast channel as the new parameter r A;2 . As he doesn't know the related parameter k A;2 he can't compute s A;2 . Thus he has to use the eavesdroped value s A;1 . But this is only the correct value if m 0 1 = m 0 2 and r 1 = r 2 . As the hash function is collision-free the rst condition is satis ed in those cases where the same group of signers signs the same message twice. Thus this attack is not successful. Other possibilities might be to forge the individual signature of Alice or the multisignature. Both cases can be seen as the attempt to forge the used variant of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme. A detailed security analysis for the Meta-ElGamal scheme is described in HMP294]. Stronger attacks seems to be useless because m 0 changes if a di erent group of signers signs the same messsage or di erent messages are signed. It seems to be hard to combine them to get additional signatures.
2. Insider attack: Insiders can try to choose their parameters k i such that r is chosen suitable, like in the second attack described in section three. If they x r in advance they must be able to compute discrete logarithms if they don't know at least one of the values r i . This contradicts the discrete logarithm assumption. 3. Clerk attack: The clerk might reveal individual signatures but this doesn't endanger the security of the scheme. If he doesn't compute the multisignature correctly from the individual signatures the veri cation equation of the multisignature is not satis ed and thus this attack can be discovered by the veri ers.
Performance analysis For the signature generation each signer has nearly the same computational e ort than in the chosen variant of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme. The clerk has to check each individual signature, for which he needs 2t or 3t exponentiations depending on the chosen variant. The computation of the multisignature needs low costs if the parameter g is chosen suitable (e.g. as addition or multiplication). The signature size is given by two long integers and the message. For the veri cation of the multisignature two or three exponentiations are necessary, depending of the used variant. The most e cient variants are corresponding to the most e cient variants of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme (e.g. EG II.3, EG III.3, EG V.4). Thus the scheme reviewed in section 2 is one of the most e cient multisignature schemes. Note that in message recovery signature schemes the message and not a hash value of the message must be signed if we don't want to append the message to the signature. Furthermore in the schemes with one-message block the data expansion is rather high because the identi ers of the signers must be appended to the message to countermeasure the second attack given in section three. Another solution is to use message recovery signature schemes with two message blocks { one is recovered by the veri cation equation and the other one is appended to the signature and just contains the identi ers of the signers. We give some e cient variants in table 3, where ID is computed by ID := h(ID 1 ; : : :; ID t ) using a public hash function h assuming that the users u 1 ; : : :; u t wants to sign the message m and the function d is chosen as above. Table 3 : E cient MMR schemes with two messages blocks suitable for multisignatures A detailed description of the Meta-Message recovery multisignature scheme is similar to the Meta-ElGamal multisignature scheme described above and hence we skip it here.
Security analysis
The security analysis is similar to the security analysis of the Meta-ElGamal multisignature scheme. Performance analysis The computational e ort for signature generation and veri cation is similar to the MetaMessage recovery variants. Note that the message needs not be transmitted additionally to the signature parameters, but the message can't be hashed.
Conclusion
We presented two attacks on the multisignature scheme proposed by Harn and showed how to countermeasure them. Then we generalized a modi cation of this scheme to some variants of the Meta-ElGamal signature schemes and suggested the rst multisignature schemes giving message recovery. Furthermore we gave su cient conditions to decide which of the MetaElGamal and Meta-Message recovery variants are suitable for multisignatures.
